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Motivation: Risk can be defined as imperfect knowledge where the probabilities of the 
possible outcomes are known (Hardaker, Huirne, and Anderson 1997; Johnson and 
Boehlje 1981). Risk attitude
1 refers to the decision maker’s general or consistent tendency 
towards risks. Risk attitudes are commonly modeled within an expected utility 
framework (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947; Schoemaker 1982; Fishburn 1988) or 
using psychometrics/ Fishbeins’s multi-attribute attitude models (MacCrimmon and 
Weherug 1986). Risk perception reflects the decision maker’s interpretation of the 
likelihood of risk exposure and is defined as the decision maker’s assessment of the risk 
inherent in a particular situation. 
Within the finance literature, decision maker’s risk attitude and perception 
assessment are assumed to be important factor in ensuring successful business 
management. In this regard, any information concerning risk attitudes and perceptions of 
managers and the Boards of Directors (BODs) could be useful for co-operative 
businesses in making decisions regarding training, personnel selection, and placement. 
Furthermore, assessment of managers’ and BODs risk attitudes has important 
implications for the designing and choice of alternative financial risk management 
strategies/policies and the performance/success of co-operative businesses. Among other 
things, the process of risk management
2 may be affected by the risk attitude and risk 
perception of decision makers of the business. 
                                                 
1 An attitude is a mental or neural state of readiness, organized through experience, exerting a directive or 
dynamic influence on the individual's response to all objects and situations to which it is related (Allport 
1935).  
2 Risk management may be defined as choosing among alternative strategies to reduce risks. One of the issues in co-operative finance concerns the capital constraints facing 
the user-owned organization under the financial risks associated with the various sources 
of capital. In Canada, some co-operative agribusinesses are in financial distress as a result 
of too much debt leverage (Goddard 2002). According to Robison and Barry (1987), 
optimal debt for a business depends, among other things, on the decision maker’s risk 
attitude. For example, a risk averse decision maker would tend to hold less debt 
(MacCrimmon and Weherug 1986), ceteris paribus. Thus, in developing risk-based 
ranges of optimal debt policies, the extent to which managers or boards of directors 
(BODs) exhibit risk taking or risk avoiding behavior when making decisions with a 
variety of financial data is of specific interest.  
Since the objective of the co-operative business is the maximization of its members’ 
welfare (Bateman,  Edwards, and LeVay 1979; Enke 1945), efficient allocation of the co-
operative resources will be critical to whether the sector is competitive nationally and 
internationally. Theoretical evidence suggests that co-operative businesses are less efficient than 
investor-owned firms (Sexton, Wilson, and Wann 1989), due mainly to director lack of business 
expertise as compared to directors of investor-owned firms (Helmberger 1966) and the lack of an 
incentive structure in co-operatives to induce management to run the association efficiently 
(Caves and Petersen 1986). These problems may be related to risk attitude differentials 
between managers and the board of directors leading to differing opinions regarding 
investment, consolidation, and borrowing and ultimately firm financial risk exposure and 
implemented risk management strategies. No study has attempted to empirically scrutinize 
the impact of risk attitude differentials on co-operative business performance. Arguably, the 
variation in debt leveraging risk could be due to the increase in the transaction costs associated with efforts to resolve conflicts and costs of time taken to arrive at consensus. 
Thus, risk attitude incompatibility may impede overall efficiency of resource use. 
Literature Review: Several empirical studies have investigated risk attitudes for a variety 
of different classes of decision makers, using a variety of methods, examining a number 
of different issues (Chavas  and Holt 1990; Antle 1987; Saha, Shumway, and Talpaz 
1994; Pennings and Smidts 2001; Pennings and Leuthold 2000; Lence 2000; Pennings 
and Garcia 2001; Roosen and Hennessy 2003; Meuwissen, Huirne, and Hardaker 1999; 
Brockhaus 1980). For example, Brockhasu (1980) studies the relation between 
entrepreneurial decisions and risk. Johnson and Powell (1994) and Olen and Cox (2001) 
examine the relationship between risk attitudes and gender. Pennings and Smidts (2001) 
assess the relation between risk attitude and market behavior. Thus far, no study has 
explicitly explored the impact of divergence in risk attitudes of managers and BODs on 
business management such as selection of financial risk management strategies and 
capital structure decision. As a result, risk attitude incompatibility may impede the 
overall efficiency of resource uses. For example, risk-averse managers are expected to 
borrow less as compared to risk-taking managers. Managers’ /directors’ degree of risk-
aversion has important implication on the level of debt financing risk exposure. Different 
attitudes will affect negotiations between directors and managers and potentially lead to 
conflict. 
 
Objective: In this study we (i) construct a latent risk attitude based on observed variables, 
(ii) investigate whether risk attitude and perception differs between managers and boards 
of directors of co-operative agribusiness firms and, if so, determine the factors underlying these differences, and (iii) statistically test the impact of the differences in risk attitude, if 
any, on co-operative business financial risk exposure (e.g., borrowing decision) and 
selection of financial risk management strategies. 
 
Multi-attribute Behavioral Model: The Multi-attribute Behavioral Model has been used 
broadly to elicit unobservable decision maker risk attitudes (Pennings and Garcia 2001). 
In the Multi-attribute Behavioral Model or Fishbein multi-attribute model risk attitudes 
are theoretical constructs that are latent or are theoretical variables in that they cannot be 
directly observed. Instead, they must be inferred from observable responses. The multi-
attribute attitude model is used to organize the key concepts of behavior and predict 
behavior.  
For the purpose of this study, psychometric approach adopting the theory of 
Planned Behavior is used to elicit decision maker risk attitudes. The theory of planned 
behavior states that human behaviour/intentions are guided by attitude towards the 
behaviour (debt), subjective norm (perceived social pressure), perceived behavioural 
control (ability to affect company decisions), in addition to demographic characteristics 
(Figure 1).  
In the psychometric approach, risk attitude is a latent variable whose “value” is 
inferred by answers to multi-scale questions. A system of equation is developed based on 
Fishbein’s attitude-behavior model.   
  
Figure 1: Theory of  Planned Behaviour (Source: Aizen 2002) 
 
Preliminary results: 
  Information on the risk attitudes and risk perceptions of the co-operative 
managers and directors is collected through a survey based on theory of planned behavior 
model. The analysis in this study is based on the first 24 observations. In the survey 
questions such as “When making investment decisions, I am willing to accept more risk to 
achieve higher returns and reach member goals: Strongly Disagree … Strongly Agree” 
are asked to elicit general risk attitude managers and directors. Other specific questions 
were asked to elicit risk attitude. The actual behavior of the decision makers is also 
elicited using a set of question related to their intention. This is based on the assumption 
that behavior is the direct reflection of decision maker’s intention. Among other the 
intention questions include: “In your opinion, could excessive debt financing lead to serious financial risk in your company?” “During the next two years I will approve 
additional borrowing to finance new investments in the company.” “During the next two 
years additional investments should be financed solely through equity.” “I intend to 
approve additional borrowing to finance new investments in the company over the next 
two years.” Responses from the sample managers/directors are summarized in figures 
[2]-[5]. 
 Figure 2: In your opinion, could excessive debt financing lead to serious financial 


















Figure 3: When making investment decisions, I am willing to accept more risk to 















Figure 4: During the next two years I will approve additional borrowing to finance 


















Figure 5: During the next two years additional investments should be financed 
solely through equity. 33% 8%
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where ATB is attitude towards behaviour, SN is subjective norm, PBC is perceive 
bahvioural control, Demo is demographic characteristics (age, manager-director dummy 
variable, age, income), β, α, δ and φ are parameters to be estimated and ε’s are i.i.d. 
disturbance terms.  The above equations are simultaneously estimated and resulted are 
reported in Tables [1] and [2]. Results indicate that the coefficient on attitude towards 
debt is positive and statistically significant suggesting that decision maker’s attitude 
towards debt has a positive impact on intentions to increase debt capital. This may further suggest that capital structure may depend on decision maker’s attitude which is consistent 
with our theoretical review.  The coefficient on perceived social pressure is also 
statistically significant and negative. This may suggest that perceived social pressure to 
increase or not to increase debt capital had negative impacts on intention to increase debt. 
The coefficient on Decision makers’ perceptions of their ability to increase debt capital 
had negative impact on intention to increase debt capital. 
The coefficient on the dummy variable manager-director is negative and 
significant suggesting that sample managers might have a lower intention to increase debt 
capital than directors. The coefficient on respondents’ age is negative and statistically 
significant in all equations. This may suggest that age had a negative impact on, attitude 
towards debt, subjective norm, perceived behavioral control and intention to increase 
debt. Education had a positive impact on intention to increase debt capital and negative 
impact on attitude towards debt capital. 
One of the hypotheses in this study is to test if there is difference in attitude 
towards debt capital between managers and directors of co-operative firms. In equations 
the coefficient on the dummy variable manager-director is statistically significant and 
negative.  This may indicate that differing attitudes towards increasing debt capital or 
intention to increase debt capital between managers and directors may increase agency 
cost problems. Ultimately, this divergence in attitude may result in significant costs 
(transaction costs of negotiation) associated with resolving conflicts. In sum, decision 
maker’s attitude towards debt may affect corporate financial risk management policy.  
Further research is warranted to investigated if  the manager-board difference in attitude 
towards debt affect the success of the business.  
 
Table 1: Determinants of Attitude towards Debt, Subjective Norm, and Perceived 
Behavioural Control 
Variables   Attitude  Subjective Norm  Behavioral Control 
  Estimates  t-ratio   Estimates t-ratio   Estimates  t-ratio  
Intercept 16.753  3.119  7.056  1.161  48.397  2.341 
Age -1.655  -1.976  -1.543  -1.447  -8.537  -1.987 
Manager (=1)  -6.088  -2.969  -6.077  -2.753  -23.416  -3.239 
Education -1.423  -2.677  0.467  0.740  0.864  0.404 
Income -0.158  -0.603  -0.056  -0.175  1.225  1.032 
 
Table 2: Factor Affecting Decision Makers Intention to increase Debt Capital 
(During the next two years I will approve additional borrowing to finance new 
investments in the company) (n=24)  
Variables   Estimates  t-ratio 
Intercept 0.041  0.014 
Attitude towards Debt  2.220  2.421 
Subjective  Norm  -1.740  -3.874 
Perceived Behavioural Control  -0.488  -2.972 
Age -3.265  -1.851 
Manager (=1)  -8.057  -1.973 
Education 4.355  3.007 
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